Bioassay Vessel Rupture Analysis by unknown
TECHNICAL ARTICLE—PEER-REVIEWED
Bioassay Vessel Rupture Analysis
Philip R. Vormelker
Submitted: 11 May 2009 / Published online: 3 June 2009
 ASM International 2009
Abstract Two high-pressure bioassay vessels failed at
the Savannah River Site during separate events using a
standard procedure for microwave heating of biosamples.
Improper installation of the thermal shield in the first vessel
caused the rupture during microwave heating. The second
vessel rupture is attributed to over pressurization during
testing. The vessel rupture appeared to initiate in the mold
parting line, the thinnest cross-section of the octagonal
vessel. No material flaws were found in the vessel that
would impair structural performance during typical usage.
Limits to thermal cycling have been suggested to avoid
premature vessel rupture due to fatigue.
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Introduction
Routine bioassay sample testing was performed at the
Savannah River Site for personnel evaluation. Two poly-
meric bioassay vessels ruptured at recorded temperatures
from 220 to 230 C and recorded pressures ranging from
325 to 550 psig (2.2–3.8 MPa). The door of a microwave
oven door glass blew out during an earlier rupture (Fig. 1)
that was not included in this analysis. All three ruptures
occurred during a 3-month testing period.
During normal test procedures, a small bioassay sample,
a gel-type cation resin, and concentrated nitric acid are
placed into a polytetrafluoroethylene (PTFE) inner vessel
and a thermoplastic polyetherimide (PEI) outer vessel. The
vessel is then heated to a maximum of 220 C for a min-
imum of 35 min. The maximum pressure is pre-set to be
controlled to less than 550 psig (3.5 MPa). The sample
vessels are hot after the test and are allowed to cool down
prior to handling. Gel-type resin is used for selective sep-
aration of metals, specifically plutonium and americium,
from the bioassay sample.
The inner vessel is designed for temperatures up to
250 C (PTFE softening temperature) and for pressures up
to 625 psig (4.3 MPa). Burst tests by the manufacturer
revealed vessel rupture at 1500–1700 psig (10.3–11.7 MPa)
at 23 C and approximately 1200 psig (8.3 MPa) at 220 C.
For bioassay testing, a pressure relief disk is normally
mounted on the top of each vessel. The disk is shown by
manufacturer’s testing to release the vessel pressure at 720
psig (5 MPa). The pressure relief disk did not release
during the two vessel ruptures described in this paper.
During normal testing, ten vessels are inserted in the
microwave carousel and one of these vessels is connected
to a pressure sensor for microwave wattage control. Power
is increased incrementally until reaching the maximum
pressure per test procedure. The pressure in the inner
container increases when the microwave is in operation
because of decomposition of the organics and vaporization
of water in the bioassay samples. The electronic pressure
protection and control system shuts off power if the vessel
pressure reaches 625 psig (4.3 MPa). The control system
also monitors temperature in the same vessel.
The vessel design (Fig. 2) is such that the bioassay
sample is placed in the inner vessel which is then placed in
the outer vessel. The cap to inner vessel is then fitted on top
of the inner vessel. The screw on cap for the outer vessel is
then placed over the inner vessel cap and tightened. The
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tightening process seals the inner vessel cap to the vessel
body creating a pressure tight container. The inner vessel
slip on cap holds the pressure relief device. The pressure
relief device includes a threaded nozzle with an internal
hole and a pressure relief disk. The threaded nozzle is made
of PTFE polymer while the relief disk is made of PFA
(perfluoroalkoxy, a variation of PTFE). The inner vessel
contains the biomaterial and is machined from a modified
PTFE polymer, Dyneon TFMTM PTFE 1700 (DTFM).1
This vessel is inserted into the outer vessel which is made
of injection-molded polyetherimide UltemTM 2300.2 The
PTFE and PFA polymers are nearly transparent to micro-
wave energy due to their low dissipation factors (ratio of
the material’s power absorption (heat) to the power trans-
mitted through it) [1–3]. Thus, heating of the inner and
outer vessels is due to the heating of the contained bioassay
samples.
The inner vessel reaches approximately 220 C during
the microwave heating process. The outer vessel remains at




Figure 3 shows that the bottom of the outer vessel fractured
with no visible cracking in the upper part of the vessel. The
cap did not fail. In Fig. 4, the thermal shield is inserted into
the bottom piece of the vessel in the upright position. The
top surface of the shield is above the fractured surface.
Fig. 2 Components of outer (a) and inner (b) vessels and caps. This
cap (c) includes threaded pressure relief nozzle (d). Thermal shield (e)
is inserted in bottom of outer vessel
Fig. 3 The first vessel rupture (No. 1) reveals full bottom head
separation. This rupture mode differed considerably from the No. 2
rupture shown in Fig. 6
Fig. 1 Interior of microwave after vessel rupture. Parts of the failed
vessel remained in the microwave after rupture (shown by arrows)
and the vessel carousel was also damaged
1 Trademark of Dyneon LLC, Oakdale, MN, USA.
2 Trademark of General Electric, Schenectady, NY, USA.
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However, where the shield is shown upside down (Fig. 5),
the position of the fractured surface is near the bottom edge
of the shield. This is consistent with the manufacturer’s
position that the vessels will fail at lower than anticipated
pressures if the thermal shield is inverted. When the ther-
mal shield is installed correctly, the installed inner vessel
and cap will look like Fig. 4. When installed incorrectly,
there is a slight gap, approximately 1/16 in. (8 mm), as
shown in Fig. 5. The tightening of the outer vessel cap
when the thermal shield is upside down would therefore
impose additional compressive stresses on the inner vessel
and an axial tensile stress on the outer vessel. This axial
stress is additive to the stresses induced by pressurization
of the inner canister and will lower the rupture pressure of
the outer container.
Differential thermal expansions between the thermal
shield and the outer vessel and between the inner and outer
vessels may also contribute to the failure. The differential
thermal expansion between the hot inner vessel and the
colder outer vessel will increase the compressive stresses
on the inner vessel and also increase the axial tensile stress
acting on the wall of the outer vessel. Thus, the
combination of stresses induced by cap tightening, internal
pressure and differential thermal expansion all act to place
the outer vessel in axial tension. The tensile stress on the
outer vessel wall increases as the temperature and pressure
inside the inner vessel increase.
It is unlikely that circumferential pressure from thermal
expansion of the thermal shield plays a role in the rupture.
However, the combination of axial expansion of thermal
shield and inner vessel pressure, coupled with the tight-
ening induced stresses, could be sufficient to cause rupture
at the bottom of the outer vessel. When the thermal shield
is inverted, the tightening stresses could easily be higher
than those induced with a properly placed thermal shield.
This scenario is consistent with the manufacture’s position
that an inverted thermal shield could lower the rupture
pressure of the container system.
The fracture of the outer vessel would relieve the
compressive axial stresses acting on the inner vessel wall
and suddenly require the now non-supported, inner vessel
wall to carry the tensile stresses induced by the internal
pressure. The sudden change in stress state caused the inner
vessel to fracture, as shown in Fig. 3.
Fig. 4 Inner vessel shown inserted into outer vessel with correctly
placed thermal shield (lower photo). No gap is visible at A
Fig. 5 Inner vessel shown inserted into outer vessel with inverted
thermal shield as shown in lower photo. Note *1/16 in. gap at B
between inner vessel and top of outer vessel
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Second Rupture
Initial observation of this rupture revealed that the outer
vessel (PEI) cracked into multiple pieces while the inner
vessel also showed multiple cracks but did not fragment
nearly as extensively as the outer vessel (Fig. 6). Sides of
the inner vessel (PTFE) appeared to have blown out with
the initial rupture occurring near the bottom (Fig. 7 and 8).
A bulge is visible on the side of the PTFE vessel, just
above a ‘‘notch’’ in the fracture path (Fig. 8). A similar
‘‘notch’’ also appears in the outer vessel, just below the
notch in the inner vessel (Fig. 8). The bulge is shown at
higher magnification in Fig. 8B. No defect in the PTFE is
visible at this location but this is considered to be the initial
rupture site of the PTFE. It appears that pressure in the
PTFE vessel caused localized expansion and ballooning of
the inner vessel. The ballooned portion of the inner vessel
pressed against the wall of the outer vessel, localizing the
stresses in that region. When the localized stresses excee-
ded to fracture strength of the outer vessel, the outer vessel
ruptured. The inner vessel was then free to expand and
crack and fracture of the inner vessel initiated at the bulge.
The inner vessel fracture was accompanied by both
Fig. 6 Parts of the second failed vessel that were ejected from the
microwave oven. The outer vessel is identified by A with the inner
vessel by B. The single screw and washers are not part of this vessel.
The round component beneath the washers is the thermal shield
Fig. 7 The initiation of rupture in the inner PTFE vessel (second
vessel rupture) appears to occur either circumferentially at the
bottom, in a vertical direction, or both
Fig. 8 Inner PTFE vessel of
Fig. 7 is shown positioned
within outer vessel. Note
matching fracture peaks in inner
and outer vessels (A). A bulge
in the PTFE is visible at B with
an enlarged view on right which
is most likely the initial site of
the PTFE vessel rupture after
rupture of the outer vessel
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circumferential cracking at the bottom and axial cracking
through the bulge and at other locations.
The lack of macroscopic ductility in the PEI outer
vessel is apparent when the failed outer vessel is taped
together (Fig. 9). The multiple cracks in the outer vessel
and the associated cracking of the screwed on lid show that
the initial fracture was accompanied by the rapid release of
stored strain energy. Some of the stored strain energy was
released by the formation of new fracture surfaces in the
PEI outer vessel. The crack pattern (Fig. 10 and 11) sug-
gests the mold parting line was a region that was very
susceptible to fracture. An injection molded part usually
displays two lines, 180 apart where the mold separates,
similar to a clamshell. When the components of Fig. 9 and
10 are laid side by side, fracture at the mold parting line is
clearly visible (Fig. 11). However, other crack paths were
also active during the fracture process. It should be
emphasized that the fracture of both the inner and outer
vessels was accompanied by large-scale strain energy
release and multiple fractures.
Based upon the above discussion, the outer vessel failed
first due to localized stress concentrations developed
because of the expansion and bulging of the inner vessel.
The absence of strain hardening in the PTFE material
assures that once bulging initiates, deformation will con-
tinue in the bulged region. Assuming that the internal
pressure in the inner container is uniform, bulging will
initiate in the weakest and probably the thinnest portion of
the container wall. As the bulge presses against the outer
vessel, the stress in the outer vessel increased and was
highest at the region of contact between the bulge and the
outer vessel wall.
The stresses in the outer vessel wall could have been
higher than expected if there was moisture in the annular
space between the two vessels. The addition of pressure
Fig. 9 The outer vessel from the second vessel rupture showing
components taped together. Note that all cracks propagated along a
curved path on the bottom part of the shell in this photo
Fig. 10 Opposite side of the failed outer vessel from Fig. 9 with
components taped together. In this case, a crack is barely visible along
the mold parting line at arrows
Fig. 11 Second vessel rupture. Failed outer shell components lined
up side by side to show vessel fracture surfaces. The mold parting line
is located at arrows marked A. The crack appears to initiate either
near B or slightly above it where the bulge in the PTFE vessel
occurred. At C the fracture surface appears lighter, possibly due to a
decrease in crack growth rate because of the constraint imposed by
the cap that was present over the threaded portion of the container
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from the conversion of absorbed moisture to steam in the
annular space would have increased the strain energy in the
vessel wall and may cause rupture at lower than expected
inner vessel pressures. However, the rupture appears to
have initiated near the bulge as shown in Fig. 8 and
bulging would have been inhibited if pressure developed in
the annular space.
SEM evaluation of the fracture surfaces showed two
different types of fractures. One (Fig. 12) shows a flat,
brittle fracture typical of rapid crack growth in fiber rein-
forced plastics. This fracture topography was found in the
grey colored areas lying below the light color area (C) of
Fig. 11. Another type of fracture topography was observed
in light color area at C. This topography was typical of
slow crack growth in ductile, fiber reinforced plastics
(Fig. 13), and shows both fiber pullout and plastic defor-
mation of the polymer matrix. When compared to the
fracture surface of a deliberately failed vessel, the induced
fracture surface (Fig. 14), the surface of Fig. 13 appears
very similar but the induced fracture showed less evidence
of plastic deformation.
Pressure Relief Device Testing
A common element in these ruptures is that the pressure
relief device did not release. The manufacturer tests of the
pressure relief device showed that the release pressure was
Fig. 12 Fracture surface below light color C location in Fig. 13. The
fracture surface appears very brittle and is consistent with rapid crack
growth rates. Round holes are prior fiber locations. Note that the
magnification is only 5009 compared with 8009 in Fig. 13
Fig. 13 Fracture surface at C location (light color) in Fig. 11
showing glass fibers sticking out of a torn, ductile surface. This
topography suggests low crack growth rates
Fig. 14 Fracture surface of induced rupture of new vessel showing
relatively flat but ductile surface with fibers and a few holes (A)
where fibers were pulled out. This fracture surface suggests crack
growth rates intermediate between those associated with Fig. 12 and
13
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720 psig (5 MPa). Pressure testing was performed to
determine release pressures of samples from our inventory.
The pressure relief device includes a threaded nozzle
(Fig. 15) allowing it to be hand threaded into the cap on the
inner vessel and a rupture disk. The rupture disk, a solid,
circular disk (Fig. 16) made of Teflon PFA (polyper-
fluoroalkoxyethylene), is inserted in the cap prior to
threading the nozzle. The disk is approximately 0.020 in.
(0.5 mm) thick with a 0.315 in. (8 mm) diameter and is
designed to deform around the circumference to allow
pressure release through the threads.
The inner vessel cap was drilled and threaded to allow
for hose attachment to a high-pressure fitting (Fig. 17).
Early testing with a used nozzle and new rupture disk
resulted in measured release pressures of 1025–1267 psig
(7–8.7 MPa). This testing was accomplished using a
pressure rise rate of 120 psig/min (0.8 MPa/min). Heater
tape was wrapped around the cap for testing at higher
temperatures, 98–104 C. At the elevated temperature the
release pressure was measured at 785–968 psig (5.4–6.7
MPa). These elevated temperature tests were conducted
using a new nozzle of the old design and a lower pressure
rise rate. Pressure release in all tests was very audible and
gage pressure dropped significantly. It was also observed
that the used nozzle was easy to hand thread whereas the
new nozzle was more difficult. After the initial test with the
new nozzle, the ease of threading was similar to that for
used nozzle. Pressurization of the new threads probably
caused thread deformation to allow easier fit-up during the
next use.
Doubling the pressure rise to 240 psig/min (1.7 MPa/min)
resulted in release pressures of 1398–1428 psig (9.6–
9.9 MPa) with a used and a new nozzle (old design). Since
these pressures were very high, a pressure rise of 120 psig/
min was used for remaining tests. A new nozzle design
(Fig. 18) with a flat face was also tested. At room tempera-
ture, the release pressures were 832–848 psig (5.7–5.9 MPa)
Fig. 15 Pressure relief nozzle types. Type A (new design) was used
in an earlier vessel rupture. Type B (old design) was used in both
ruptures described in this paper. Note the longer taper on Type B
versus Type A
Fig. 16 Pressure relief disk from testing. The taper on the nozzle
allowed disk deformation as pressure increased. Note the rolled-up
edges. This disk does not rupture at normal operating pressures but
distorts to allow air to escape around the nozzle threads
Fig. 17 PTFE inner vessel cap with pressure fitting attached for
testing rupture disk rupture. Heating tape was wrapped around the
outer diameter to increase temperature. The pressure relief disk is
inserted at position A, beneath nozzle
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with gage pressures dropping very slowly after the release.
These pressure values were a little higher than with the old
design nozzle. This is expected since the new nozzle design
has a flat head versus the bevel design on the old nozzle. In all
tests, the rupture disk did not fail but did provide a path for
pressure release. However, the relief pressures were higher
than the manufacturer’s test results. These higher than
anticipated release pressures are consistent with the bioassay
vessels failures during service. Simply put, the pressure
inside the inner vessel may not have been released by the
rupture disk and the inner vessel pressure ultimately excee-
ded the pressure required to induce rupture in the outer
vessel.
Calculations
The physical evidence demonstrates that failures initiated
in the outer vessels when the mechanically induced stresses
exceeded the strength of the vessel wall. The wall stresses
were induced because of tightening the outer vessel cap to
seal the inner vessel and the expansion of the inner vessel
as it was heated and pressurized. Improper installation of
the thermal shield contributed significantly to the first
failure while localized bulging of the inner vessel caused
the initiation of the second failure. However, both the
second failure and the original failure that was not a part of
this analysis demonstrated that when the inner vessel
failed, the pressure that developed in the outer vessel was
sufficient to rupture the outer vessel. Therefore, pressure
vessel calculations were performed on the outer vessel
using hoop stresses per Roark and Young [4] with guidance
from ASME Section VIII [5]. Note: ASME Section VIII
was written for the use of metallic materials only; thus,
calculations using the ASME Section VIII are for com-
parison purposes only.
The maximum calculated circumferential stress is 2731
psi (18.8 MPa) when the internal pressure in the vessel is
550 psi (3.8 MPa). With internal pressures of 600 and 800
psig (4.1 and 5.5 MPa), the calculated circumferential stress
is 2980 and 3973 psi (20.6 and 27.4 MPa), respectively [4].
The allowable stress level at 177 C as per Table 1 is above
the calculated stress value at 550 psi but below the calcu-
lated stress values when the pressure reaches 600 psi. Thus,
the actual pressure that must have developed in the outer
vessel upon rupture (or venting) of the inner vessel must
have been at least 600 psig per the Roark and Young cal-
culation. The ASME calculation results in an allowable
stress of 2976 psi (20.5 MPa) when the internal pressure is
700 psig. The ASME allowable pressure estimate thus is
similar to the Roark and Young calculation. Taken together,
these calculations suggest that the pressures developed in
the outer vessel were probably within the range of 600–800
psig (4.1–5.5 MPa) at vessel rupture.
Development of a 600–800 psig (4.1–5.5 MPa) pressure
in outer vessel requires that the inner vessel pressure
Fig. 18 Face of Type A pressure relief nozzle is flat with no ID taper. Face diameter is approximately 5/16 in. Hole diameter is approximately
0.075 in. Face of Type B pressure relief nozzle has a taper. Face diameter is approximately 5/16 in. Hole diameter (B) is approximately 0.080–
0.084 in.





Ultimate tensile strength, psi (MPa)
23 C (73 F) 23300 (161) 5800 (40)
150 C (302 F) 14225 (98)
177 C (351 F) 12000 (83)
190 C (374 F) 8000 (55)
204 C (400 F) 1247 (8.6)
220 C (446 F) 8190a (56.5) 1000a (7)
Allowable strength, psi (manufacturer’s data)
20 C (4 F) 8000 (55)
0 C (32 F) 7100 (49)
23 C (73 F) 6200 (42.8)
93 C (199 F) 4600 (31.7)
177 C (351 F) 2900 (20)
Elongation, %
23 C (73 F) 3 650
150 C (302 F) 1.55 NA
Continuous use temperature
C (F) 180 (356) 260 (500)
a Linear regression values from tensile stress versus temperature data
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exceed those values. Additionally, it should be emphasized
that the inner vessel probably did not vent until failure
initiated in the outer vessel. Therefore, for the outer vessel
to shatter, as observed in the second failure, the pressure
release from the inner vessel had to greatly exceed the
ability of the outer vessel to vent.
Development of excessive pressures in the inner vessel
depends on several factors:
1. The pressure relief device must fail to vent at its design
pressure. The vent pressure is a function of tempera-
ture, rate of pressure rise and disk placement. The lack
of venting at inner vessel pressures in excess of 700
psig has been clearly demonstrated; thus this factor can
easily be satisfied.
2. The bioassay sample in the vessel of interest must
behave differently (induce higher pressures) than the
sample in the control vessel. There are ten samples in a
batch and only one sample is attached to the control
system. Each sample is different; thus this factor is
also easily satisfied.
3. The combination of stresses induced on the outer
vessel by the processes of cap tightening, thermal
expansion, internal pressurization and localized defor-
mation of the inner vessel must exceed the mechanical
strength of the outer vessel. The fact that very few
failures have occurred demonstrates that this factor is
seldom satisfied.
Material Properties
A form of PTFE is used for inner vessel construction
(Fig. 5) primarily for its superior chemical inertness. The
actual material is DTFM, a modification of PTFE. The
mechanical properties of DTFM (Table 1) show that ten-
sile strength is approximately 5800 psi (40 MPa) and the
elongation is 650% at room temperature [1]. At 204 and
260 C, the tensile strength drops significantly to 1250 and
870 psi (8.6 and 6 MPa), respectively. The 870 psi value is
based on PTFE data which may be slightly higher than that
for the DTFM. Elongation values above room temperature
are not available but are assumed to be higher than those at
room temperatures. While there is no definitive glass
transition temperature for PTFE, the softening temperature
is 260 C which is also the continuous use temperature for
this version of PTFE. This is above the standard bioassay
test temperature of 220 C.
The outer vessel and the thermal shield are injection
molded with a PEI thermoplastic filled with 30% glass fiber
[1]. The tensile strength of this polymer is approximately 4
times higher than the PTFE strength (Table 1) and about 8
times the strength at 150 C. The PEI strength shows an
approximately 50% reduction between 150 and 220 C.
Although strength is much higher than PTFE, the PEI resin
is limited in ductility and toughness. At room temperature,
the elongation value is only 3% [1] and is estimated to be
1.55% at 150 C. The manufacturer’s product guide states
that the PEI resin is suitable for continuous service at
temperatures up to 180 C [1] or 40 C below the inner
vessel operating temperature. Additionally, a potential
fatigue problem also exists with long-term use of this PEI
polymer at high temperatures. The glass transition tem-
perature, Tg, for the PEI material is 215 C (419 F) which
means that increased molecular mobility above this tem-
perature may cause significant changes in material
properties [1].
Data for the PEI resin show a significant reduction in
impact strength after 40 h of steam sterilization cycles (30
min/cycle) at 132 C per ASTM D1822 [6]. The effect of dry
sterilization at 160 C (time not specified) shows no effects
on this particular PEI polymer [7]. Therefore, the presence of
moisture appears to have significant impact upon tempera-
ture stability. In addition, multiple temperature cycles above
these temperatures may increase degradation.
The mechanical property data suggest that the load
carrying capacity of the outer vessel decreases with use.
This decrease represents another factor that can contribute
to the potential for failure. The number of cycles that can
be accommodated without compromising the properties of
the material has not been established. Therefore, testing
should be performed to identify this cycle limit.
Conclusion and Recommendations
Two bioassay vessels failed during testing in the SRS
bioassay laboratory facilities. The first vessel rupture is
attributed to incorrect placement of the thermal shield disk.
A bright color stripe is suggested for use at the top of the
inner vessel to allow quick identification of improper
placement of the thermal shield. The second vessel rupture
is attributed to over pressurization based on calculations
and non-release of the pressure relief device. No flaws were
found in this vessel that would impair structural integrity.
A digital display of the temperature and pressure may be
necessary to allow the operator to respond to faulty sensors.
The use of thicker, cylindrical vessels or fiber-reinforcement
type webbing wrapped around the outer vessel would pro-
vide additional pressure protection. If possible, content
weight could be reduced to allow lower operating pressures.
Since moisture can cause pressure in the annular space, the
vessels need to be as dry as possible to minimize pressure
buildup. Since thermal aging of the vessels may be detri-
mental to their performance, it is recommended that
additional tests be performed in order to determine cycle
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life. Testing is also recommended to verify uniform heating
and pressure generation at maximum temperatures for all
vessel locations.
However, it should be recognized that failure is a very
infrequent event and that the consequences of any failure
can be minimized by reducing the maximum pressure
allowed to develop in the inner vessel. Therefore, at a
minimum, the pressure release device should be modified
to assure vessel venting at the desired maximum pressure.
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